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Abstract
We and our colleagues have been doing studies of great ape gestural communication for more than 30 years. Here we attempt 
to spell out what we have learned. Some aspects of the process have been reliably established by multiple researchers, for 
example, its intentional structure and its sensitivity to the attentional state of the recipient. Other aspects are more contro-
versial. We argue here that it is a mistake to assimilate great ape gestures to the species-typical displays of other mammals 
by claiming that they are fixed action patterns, as there are many differences, including the use of attention-getters. It is 
also a mistake, we argue, to assimilate great ape gestures to human gestures by claiming that they are used referentially and 
declaratively in a human-like manner, as apes’ “pointing” gesture has many limitations and they do not gesture iconically. 
Great ape gestures constitute a unique form of primate communication with their own unique qualities.
Keywords Apes · Gestures · Communication
There are two broad perspectives from which human lan-
guages may be viewed. First, they may be viewed as sys-
tems of representation in which symbolic vehicles represent 
external realities. This is the perspective of many cognitive 
scientists, especially those espousing the so-called represen-
tational theory of mind. Second, human languages may be 
viewed as conventionalized forms of social action in which 
communicative agents attempt to influence one another’s 
psychological states in various ways. This is the perspective 
of an otherwise diverse group of social scientists from vari-
ous disciplines, who accept that a language is a representa-
tional medium but at the same time insist that the representa-
tional function operates always and only in the service of the 
social function. Does that colorful piece of cloth represent 
a country (or does that funny sound represent X)? Only if 
someone intends that someone else take it to do so.
The great discovery of Seyfarth et al. (1980) was that 
some forms of primate vocal communication (e.g., vervet 
monkey alarm calls) seem to operate representationally: Dif-
ferent calls are used systematically in association with spe-
cific classes of referents. The implications of this discovery 
for the evolution of human linguistic communication were 
immediately obvious. But further research soon documented 
limitations in individuals’ ability to use such representa-
tional vocalizations to communicate flexibly with differ-
ent recipients, in various psychological states, in a range of 
social circumstances (see, e.g., Cheney and Seyfarth 1990). 
Indeed, the caller seemed to have very little intentional con-
trol over the production of the vocalization at all: “Listen-
ers acquire information from signalers who do not, in the 
human sense, intend to provide it.” (Seyfarth and Cheney 
2003, p. 168); “Nonhuman primates vocalize in response 
to important events, irrespective of how potential recipients 
may view the situation.” (Zuberbühler 2005, p. 126, but see 
Schel et al. 2013; Crockford et al. 2017). In addition, it was 
perhaps noteworthy that great apes, as humans’ closest pri-
mate relatives, did not seem to have these same kinds of 
referentially specific calls, at least not to the same extent as 
various species of monkeys (and prairie dogs and chickens).
It is in this context, in the 1980s, that we began our stud-
ies of great ape gestural communication. The focus from the 
beginning was on gestures as social action aimed at influ-
encing others, taking as a starting point the many insightful 
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observations of field ethologists on the communicative 
actions and displays of species ranging from fish to birds 
to dogs. Specifically, our initial study was prompted by two 
ethological papers in the volume Action, Gesture, and Sym-
bol: Emergence of Language (Lock 1978). In one of these, 
Plooij (1978) reported and discussed an ethogram of chim-
panzee gestures, based on observations of the infants and 
juveniles in the Gombe (Kasakela) community. What was 
remarkable was that these gestures did not seem to be the 
kind of fixed action patterns characteristic of the phyloge-
netically ritualized communicative signals of the ethologists 
(e.g., bird mating displays). They seemed to be much more 
under the intentional control of the individual for flexible 
use as needed in particular social circumstances. In the 
other paper, Locke (1978) reported some ethological obser-
vations of human infants requesting to be picked up, most 
often using the well-known gesture of “arms up” toward 
the adult. This gesture was not like the most studied ges-
tures in child development, namely pointing and the use of 
iconic signs, and it certainly was not conventional linguistic 
communication. Instead, it seemed to be a kind of learned 
“intention-movement” (Tinbergen 1951, 1952): The baby 
was using a reaching-up movement not to actually crawl up 
into the adult’s arms but rather to prompt the adult to effect 
that end for her. On the surface, at least, there seemed to be 
a remarkable similarity to some of the chimpanzee gestures 
Plooij was reporting.
And so we went to watch the Yerkes chimpanzees. We 
went armed with three basic questions: (1) Did chimpan-
zees use at least some of their gestures flexibly and under 
their own intentional control?; (2) how did they learn their 
gestures, if indeed they learned them at all?; and (3) how 
did they understand what they were doing (i.e., what under-
lying processes of social cognition were involved)? In the 
background was perhaps the somewhat larger question of 
how chimpanzees’ gestural communication related to the 
evolution and development of human language. What ensued 
was a series of four observational studies (Tomasello et al. 
1985, 1989, 1994, 1997), carried out on two groups of cap-
tive chimpanzees at the Yerkes Primate Center, comprising 
one to two dozen individuals each. Later, after we arrived at 
the Max Planck Institute in Leipzig in 1998, we and our col-
leagues (especially Katja Liebal and Simone Pika) expanded 
both the ape species studied and the questions asked. We 
summarized much of this work in an edited volume (Call 
and Tomasello 2007) and further developed some theoretical 
implications in a book on the evolution of human communi-
cation (Tomasello 2008).
In the past decade or so a number of other researchers 
have also begun to investigate great ape gestural commu-
nication, including importantly in its natural habitats in the 
wild. Many of their observations and interpretations are 
broadly consistent with ours, but some disagreements have 
arisen as well. Our goal in this paper, after a brief account 
of the most important areas of agreement, is to address the 
most important of the outstanding disagreements. In gen-
eral, we will defend the view that much (not all) of great 
ape gestural communication is intentional and learned, but 
at the same time it differs from human gestural and linguis-
tic communication in being fundamentally individualistic 
rather than cooperative. Great ape gestural communication is 
a sophisticated form of individual intentionality, not human-
like shared intentionality (Tomasello 2014).
Ape gestures as intentional communication
First the basic agreements. From the beginning, what made 
great ape gestures stand out from the communicative dis-
plays of many other species was the flexibility, and seeming 
deliberateness, with which they were used. Following Brun-
er’s (1981) operational definition of intentional action, we 
singled out from chimpanzees’ social interactions specific 
acts that individuals used repeatedly toward a recipient until 
they got a particular response, at which point they ceased 
acting. Moreover, there was not a simple one-to-one map-
ping between such acts and their functions across instances 
(as is typical with fixed displays); one act might be used 
for different functions in different contexts, and one func-
tion might be effected by different acts. We called these acts 
“signals” because, following Smith (1977), the communi-
cator was not attempting to affect the recipient physically, 
but rather psychologically; she got the other to do what she 
wanted not by forcing him physically, but rather by display-
ing her intended social action and waiting for a reaction.
Bolstering this finding that chimpanzees use their ges-
tural signals intentionally, with the aim of affecting the 
psychological states of others, are two other findings. First, 
with respect to the intentional dimension, is the finding that 
chimpanzees often produce sequences of gestures toward 
a specific recipient seemingly in pursuit of a single social 
goal, for example, they might use a string of multiple differ-
ent play gestures until the other begins playing (Liebal et al. 
2004a). Hobaiter and Byrne (2011b) analyzed chimpanzee 
gesture sequences and found something very similar, con-
cluding that individuals were producing different individual 
gestures until one of them worked. Persistence to a goal, 
trying alternate means as necessary, is one of the hallmarks 
of intentional action. And the fact that they are aimed at 
other individuals (whereas vocalizations are mostly broad-
cast indiscriminately in an area) suggests that the goal was 
indeed a social (communicative) goal. Similar results have 
been found with orangutans (Cartmill and Byrne 2010).
Second, with respect to the psychological dimension, we 
also discovered more powerful audience effects in chimpan-
zee gestural communication than those reported in monkey 
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vocal communication. Whereas vervet monkeys were more 
likely to use a vocalization when specific others (e.g., kin) 
were present versus absent, we found that the apes took into 
account the perceptual access of the recipient to the signal. 
Specifically, visual signals that required that the recipient 
sees them if they were to work were given most often when 
the recipient was actually looking—whereas this was not 
true of tactile signals (Tomasello et al. 1994). They also use 
their attention-getting gestures (see below) to get others to 
look at them when that would lead to the desired result (e.g., 
they already had an involuntary play face, but the other was 
not looking at it). Moreover, on some occasions if the recipi-
ent was not looking, the communicator would move around 
in front of her to make sure she saw the signal (Liebal et al. 
2004a). We also documented such audience affects experi-
mentally, finding that apes do indeed walk around as neces-
sary to signal visually to the face of the recipient (Liebal 
et al. 2004b). These observations have been replicated by 
many different investigators, most prominently, Genty et al. 
(2009) and Hobaiter and Byrne (2011a). Appreciation that 
a signal has to be seen to be responded to, again, suggests a 
process aimed at the psychological states of others.
Great ape gestural communication interpreted as inten-
tional social acts aimed at influencing the psychological 
states of others is thus a generally accepted conceptual 
framework for the study of one important form of primate 
communication. (Although we should note that getting our 
first study published in an animal behavior journal in the 
mid-1980s proved to be impossible because behaviorist 
reviewers continually objected to calling these behaviors 
“intentional.”) Our current best attempt to operationalize an 
intentionally produced gesture is: “a behaviour that unlike 
an action is motorically ineffective. It requires the active 
participation of a partner to fulfil its purpose, it is produced 
in the presence of an audience and is tailored to the atten-
tional state of the audience. Furthermore, it involves gaze 
alternation or visual checking between social partners and 
distant objects or events, is characterized by the sender’s 
waiting for the recipient’s response and displays persistence 
and elaboration of communicative behaviour when com-
municative attempts fail”. (Liebal and Call 2012, p. 119, 
although the gaze alternation to distant events is important 
in only some instances).
Ontogenetic ritualization and the distinction 
between intention‑movements 
and attention‑getters
Now to some disagreements. Beginning with Tomasello 
et al. (1989), we systematically distinguished between two 
types of great ape gesture. From our first observations we 
had been focused on the kinds of intention-movements that 
ethologists had been observing for several decades, though 
in our case we thought they were not phylogenetically ritual-
ized but rather individually ritualized. These were things like 
an ape infant who, instead of grabbing the hair on mom’s 
back and pulling herself up, simply touched mom lightly on 
the back inducing her to lower her back to enable climbing 
on. Or a youngster raised its arm toward another hesitantly, 
as if about to hit the other one over the head, to initiate play. 
In both cases the actual act, the gestural signal, appeared 
to be “ritualized” in the sense that it was not adequate to 
force its desired outcome physically, but rather it was a trun-
cated version of a naturally meaningful social behavior. The 
“meaning” of the gesture derived from the meaning of the 
original social act.
But some gestures did not fit this pattern. For example, 
to initiate play juveniles quite often would slap the ground 
noisily toward another, or throw something at another, or 
poke another in the back vigorously. The signaler clearly was 
attempting to induce play (he had a play face), but these were 
not intention-movements of normal play behaviors. They 
seemed rather to be aimed at getting the other to look in the 
direction of the noise-maker or the thrower or the poker. 
The signaler’s desire to play was expressed in the species-
typical display of a play face and posture. So in this case the 
process was a bit more indirect. The signaler seemingly took 
control of the process by which her species-typical displays 
were perceived and responded to by a recipient. They were 
thus somewhat analogous to reports of great apes doing such 
things as hiding a fear grimace or play face with their hands 
(e.g., Tanner and Byrne 1993), or male chimpanzees in the 
wild stripping dried leaves from their stem loudly in order to 
get females’ attention to their sexual arousal (leaf-clipping; 
Nishida 1980). In this case, the “meaning” of the gesture 
derived from the species-typical display, and the attention-
getters, as we called these signals, were aimed at getting the 
recipient to attend to the display so that she could respond 
to it.
We wondered about the learning process for these two 
types of signal. We first focused on how intention-move-
ments were learned, and indeed, we assumed that they were 
learned because they were not like species-typical displays, 
which are most often fairly stereotyped, inflexible, and 
associated with only a single function. Our main strategy 
was to investigate the possibility that these gestures were 
learned through imitation, and we concluded that they were 
not. Tomasello et al. (1994) looked at similarities and dif-
ferences between two groups of captive chimpanzees and 
found as much variability within groups as between groups. 
In addition, in this same paper we reported an experimental 
study in which we trained an individual in a gesture and put 
her back in the group to see whether anyone would imitate 
it. No one did. Although there are some suggestive obser-
vations in several different studies, in general researchers 
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such as Genty et al. (2009) and Hobaiter and Byrne (2011a) 
have confirmed that imitation does not play a major role 
in great apes’ acquisition of gestures. So, we assumed that 
the process was very likely one that paralleled the etholo-
gists’ notion of ritualization, but in this case the ritualization 
was not accomplished through natural selection but through 
learning.
In our earliest descriptions, we were not very clear about 
how much the process was a more low-level mutual shaping 
or a more cognitive one in which individuals understood 
what the other was intending to do (And indeed at the time, 
based on available evidence, we tended toward the leaner 
interpretation). But the way we would describe it now is 
that an individual actually performs some social act toward 
a recipient, and over repeated instances the recipient starts 
anticipating what the actor intends (or will do) based on 
some initial part of the act; the actor notes that the recipient 
anticipates his intention (or what he will do) on the basis 
of this initial sequence, and infers a causal link in the sense 
that he understands that it is this initial part of the act that 
instigates the reaction. The initial part of the act becomes 
“emancipated” from the physically efficacious dimensions 
of the original social act; it becomes ritualized. We observed 
many gestures that seem to have this form, like the touch-
back for infants wanting to climb on mom’s back and the 
arm-raise for initiating play with peers cited above. But the 
attention-getters could not be learned in exactly this way. So 
we hypothesized that individuals did things that made noise 
for whatever reason, and then observed that when they did 
so others tended to look in their direction. But we did not 
pursue this hypothesis further to try to nail down the acqui-
sition process of attention-getters in more detail, beyond 
documenting (Tomasello et al. 1997) that the precise actions 
involved varied quite widely even for the same individual 
on different occasions (e.g., ground-slap covered all kinds 
of slapping actions on all kinds of substrates), suggesting 
not an inflexible species-typical display, but rather an action 
defined by its function, in this case the social function of 
drawing attention to the self.
In a series of papers over the past few years, Byrne and 
colleagues have argued for a different account of great ape 
gestures (see Byrne, this volume). They believe that great 
ape gestures are basically just species-typical communica-
tive displays that have somehow come under flexible inten-
tional control. In this sense, gestures are not so different 
from vocalizations whose mostly inflexible nature in produc-
tion is amply demonstrated (e.g., Hammerschmidt and Fis-
cher 2008). In arguing for this account, they have criticized 
our account on two basic points. First and most directly, 
they have questioned whether great apes actually learn ges-
tures through ontogenetic ritualization. In a curious analysis 
Hobaiter and Byrne (2011a) chose two chimpanzee gestures 
that resemble a social action used for the same function: the 
begging-reach gesture, potentially ritualized from actually 
taking food, and the position gesture, potentially ritualized 
from attempting to physically position a grooming partner. 
In both cases the gesture clearly resembles the social action: 
“these gestures and actions were … similar: they were, after 
all, originally picked out as having… basic similarity of 
form” (Hobaiter and Byrne 2011a, p. 763). But they then 
proceed to analyze the actual body movements in minute 
detail for such things as: the orientation of the palm, the 
position of the fingers, and the part of the hand that was pre-
sented first. Because at this level of detail the ritualized ges-
ture was different from the social action, they conclude that 
the gesture was not ritualized from the action. But, of course, 
one could also argue that such things as the orientation of 
the palm with the position of the fingers are not the level of 
detail at which the chimpanzees understand and produce the 
social action. (And it is likely that the begging-reach gesture 
is not ritualized from taking food but from holding the hand 
under the mouth of the eater, which accounts for the palm 
oriented up.)
In response, Halina et al. (2013) studied in detail the ges-
tures used by 10 bonobo infants and their mothers to initiate 
carries, that is, the mother carrying the infant on the back 
in travel (see Rossano, this volume, for more detail). Impor-
tantly in the current context, the social actions involved in 
initiating this behavior are different when they come from 
the mother (who most often grasps the infant and places it 
on her back) and from the infant (who most often attempts, 
in one way or another, to climb on), providing different raw 
material for the ritualization process in the two cases. A 
main finding was that there were four gestures used only by 
infants, two gestures used only by mothers, and three ges-
tures that were used by both, albeit in very different ways. 
In each case the gesture used resembled a corresponding 
social act. For example, the spread-legs gesture was used by 
three of the infants to request a carry: The infant would hang 
from a rope or branch by her hands and reach out toward 
the mother with her legs. In the social action, the infant did 
this when the mom was right below her and she could just 
climb on, but when it was used gesturally, the infant used a 
truncated version from a distance to request that the mother 
come over to her so she could climb on. Importantly, the 
three infants that used this gesture came from the same 
social group, whereas the seven other infants did not use it 
at all. This was mainly because the three gesturing infants 
lived in a physical setting with many opportunities for hang-
ing by the hands, whereas the others did not. There was 
also one idiosyncratic gesture used by only one infant (spin 
body), and not by others, even those who were observed for 
many hours (up to an asymptote such that additional hours 
observation revealed no new gestures). We would argue that 
these observations establish quite solidly that at least some 
great ape gestures are ontogenetically ritualized.
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Byrne and colleagues also question the distinction 
between intention-movements and attention-getters. This 
is based partly on their doubting that some ape gestures are 
actually ontogenetically ritualized social actions, as just 
detailed. Genty et al. (2009) found for gorillas that ges-
tures that resembled corresponding social actions to some 
degree and gestures that did not were both used equally 
flexibly and for similar functions (e.g., for chase, cuddle, 
etc.). But the key point is that even if they are both used 
flexibly for the same final function, for example, play, they 
work in different ways. For instance, slapping the ground 
or throwing stuff at a partner, as attention-getters, does not 
directly relate to play in a way that the recipient could be 
expected to understand, and indeed in our original studies 
both the ground-slap and throw-stuff gestures were used in 
other contexts as well, for example, requesting that mom 
allow nursing. Instead, ground-slap and throw-stuff as 
requests for play were understood as such by the recipi-
ent because the gesturer was in a play posture with a play 
face, and it is these involuntary species-typical displays 
that actually convey the content of the communicative 
intention. (The desire to nurse, in the other context, was 
expressed through something like repeated (and rebuked) 
attempts to access the nipple paired with a pout-face dis-
play.) It is also worth mentioning that great apes often 
learn many novel attention-getting behaviors when inter-
acting with humans including clapping their hands, point-
ing, and spitting, in ways that are not frequently observed 
in other primate species. The large potential for gestural 
learning is fully revealed by apes acquiring rudiments of a 
human sign language (e.g., Gardner et al. 1989).
We believe that the distinction between intention-move-
ments and attention-getters is fundamental because, again, 
they work in different ways: either directly on the recipient’s 
psychological states, in the case of intention-movements, or 
indirectly on those same states via attention manipulation, 
in the case of attention-getters. Indeed, we would argue that 
even in the case of clearly inflexible species-typical displays, 
such as the gorilla chest-beat, one may specify whether the 
gesture is attaining its goal more directly or more indi-
rectly through attention manipulation. So we would clas-
sify gorilla chest-beat is an attention-getter (typically to 
displays of dominance/aggression), even if it is unlearned. 
Importantly, as Tomasello (2008) argues, the distinction 
between intention-movements and attention-getters can even 
be seen in humans’ two most basic types of natural gestures 
(i.e., excluding conventional gestures or those relating to 
language): pointing, which aims at manipulating another’s 
attention (and so are like attention-getters), and pantomime, 
which prototypically represents meaningful social acts sym-
bolically (and so are elaborated symbolic versions of inten-
tion-movements). This potential connection to the human 
case makes the distinction between intention-movements 
and attention-getters even more plausible and even more 
crucial. It is nevertheless true that we do not know how 
specific attention-getters are acquired—if indeed they are 
acquired—in individual cases. Their acquisition has not been 
studied in the kind of detail that intention-movements have 
been (as in, e.g., Halina et al. 2013).
To summarize, clearly much great ape communication 
occurs via relatively inflexible species-typical displays, as in 
the many other species studied by ethologists. Many of these 
were originally the initiating action of a meaningful social 
act, which then became phylogenetically ritualized, as the 
ethologists have documented. How could it be otherwise? 
Gestures must get their “meaning” from somewhere, and 
inherently meaningful social actions are pretty much the only 
candidate. And so the question is, if the Byrne et al. account 
has some validity, how did apes seemingly get more flexible 
intentional control over their species-typical displays? One 
possibility is through a variant on ontogenetic ritualization. 
That is to say, intelligent ape individuals see the reaction of 
others to their involuntary displays, and they learn a causal 
connection, which enables them to now produce it flexibly 
and cognitively as needed in appropriate circumstances. 
(Note that Tinbergen himself (1952, p. 1) questioned the 
notion that, at least in the case of birds, individuals may 
recognize this causal connection.) In addition, however, we 
would argue that great apes also learn at least some gestures 
in interaction with humans (e.g., Gardner et al. 1989; Gomez 
1990) and conspecific as indicated by developmental data 
(e.g., Halina et al. 2013) and the existence of idiosyncratic 
gestures (Call and Tomasello 2007). What proportion that 
might be is not known, and indeed, it might even differ for 
the different great ape species (with gorillas doing less learn-
ing). Or it might even differ for different individuals within a 
species. Halina et al. (2013) speculate in this case that when 
individuals face uncooperative partners, who do not respond 
as desired to social actions, they might face special social 
pressure to gesture and to produce it insistently.
Ape gestures as mainly dyadic 
and imperative
A second set of disagreements comes from the other direc-
tion, as it were, that is, from those who see great ape gestures 
as more human-like (e.g., Leavens et al. 2015; Lyn et al. 
2010). They see at least some great ape gestures as fully 
referential and declarative, that is, not just imperative (see 
below).
From our very first studies we stressed that almost all 
of the great ape gestures that we observed were dyadic in 
the sense that they serve to regulate a direct social interac-
tion, for example, playing, grooming, carrying, and so forth, 
with no external referents involved. Interestingly, however, 
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attention-getters do direct attention to the self, or some 
body part in some cases, which is not a third object but still 
involves something in the direction of reference. In addition, 
we and others have noted a few gestures that have something 
of a third element in them, as when one individual in a play 
mood holds out an object to another and quickly retracts it 
as an inducement to play, and we and others have also noted 
some food-begging gestures. In Tomasello et al. (1985), 
we even reported on an individual who used a gesture we 
call “point,” originally with humans, to indicate to its mom 
where on his body he wanted to be tickled, and something 
similar has also been observed in the wild in the context of 
grooming (so-called directed scratch, Pika and Mitani 2006). 
Hobaiter et al. (2013) reported four observations of chim-
panzees from the wild (three involving a single mother–child 
pair on a single occasion) in which a juvenile extended its 
hand and arm toward “a desirable but unobtainable object.” 
(Vea and Sabater-Pi 1998 also report a potential case of 
bonobo pointing in the wild with an unclear function.)
So clearly great apes know something about directing the 
attention of the other. But is their understanding such that we 
should attribute to them a human-like understanding of the 
act of reference? Are their gestures fully referential in both 
production and comprehension? To determine this we need 
experiments, and these mostly involve apes communicating 
with humans. The most systematic work has been done by 
Leavens et al. (e.g., Leavens and Hopkins 1998; Leavens 
et al. 2005), and they have found that chimpanzees will point 
for humans with persistence and gaze alternation between a 
human and a desired object. Bohn et al. (2015, 2016a; see 
also Lyn et al. 2014) even found that apes will point to an 
empty plate to request food of the type that used to be on 
the plate previously. They are directing attention in flexible 
ways so that others will see things that make them react in 
desired ways. However, in experiments in which they must 
comprehend human pointing gesture, great apes have sur-
prising difficulties. Many different studies have found that 
great apes fail to comprehend a human’s communicative 
intention when he points to the bucket (out of two or three) 
that contains food the ape desires (see Tomasello 2006, for 
a review; see Mulcahy and Call 2009, for an exceptional 
result). This comprehension failure might explain why apes 
point for humans but not for one another; why point for 
someone who does not respond appropriately?
One interpretation of great ape pointing is that it is a 
kind of ritualized reaching that humans (but not other apes) 
respond to as if it were efforts at real reaching, by retrieving 
the object for them. Apes themselves do not comprehend the 
pointing gesture as referring them helpfully to the location of 
desired food, but instead they interpret it as a ritualized reach 
for the pointer’s own benefit (which they have no desire to 
fulfill). Two other experiments also help us to interpret the 
nature of great ape pointing. First, we should note that great 
apes do not point in any studies by extending their index 
finger toward distant objects, but rather they extend their 
whole hand to close-by objects, most often resting their hand 
in the mesh of caging or the like. Starting with this observa-
tion, van der Goot et al. (2014) presented chimpanzees with 
a desirable object next to a human but some distance away. 
Chimpanzees basically never pointed to the desired object, 
but instead locomoted over to it and then reached ritualisti-
cally through the mesh for it (i.e., “pointed” for the human 
close to it). Human infants in the same situation mostly just 
pointed from a distance. Second, Halina et al. (in press) had 
a human respond to apes’ pointing to food either by looking 
at it but not responding (unwilling condition) or by looking 
in a wrong direction (misunderstanding condition). Apes did 
not respond differently in the two different conditions, sug-
gesting that they do not distinguish whether the recipient 
is unwilling to accede to their desire or is unable to com-
prehend the reference of the pointing; they just know it did 
not work. A reasonable overall interpretation, therefore, is 
that chimpanzees’ pointing comprises commands to humans 
effected via ritualized reaching, and their comprehension 
is poor because they understand others not to be informing 
them of something helpfully but to be reaching ritualistically 
for themselves.
This interpretation is bolstered by the fact that great ape 
pointing—as well as all other forms of their gesturing—is 
almost always imperative in function. That is, apes do not 
point declaratively to simply share interest and attention in 
something with another individual, and they do not point to 
inform others of things they might want or need to know—as 
human infants do from very early in ontogeny. Tomasello 
and Carpenter (2005) presented three young human-raised 
chimpanzees with situations that reliably elicit such declara-
tive pointing in human infants (e.g., surprising, interesting 
events), but observed no declaratives from them in response. 
Tomonaga et al. (2004) also report no declarative pointing 
or gesturing in their young chimpanzees despite many situ-
ations designed to elicit them. And even the signed pro-
ductions of “linguistic” apes are almost all imperatives—
approximately 96–98% in the only two systematic studies 
(Rivas 2005; Greenfield and Savage-Rumbaugh 1990), with 
the other 2–4% having no clear functional interpretation. 
(They are not clearly declarative or informative, but more 
recognitory or classificatory, as the ape simply recognizes 
a stimulus and produces the associated sign in recognition.) 
Melis et al. (2009; see also Bullinger et al. 2011) report that 
even when informative gestures would be extremely helpful 
to them—helping their partner in a mutualistic collaborative 
context—apes do not produce them (even though they will 
help their partner physically in the same situation; Melis 
and Tomasello 2013). This functional restriction to impera-
tive gesturing also contributes to apes’ surprising troubles in 
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comprehending human pointing gestures designed to inform 
them of things.
Finally, we should also note the great apes do not seem 
to produce or comprehend iconic gestures, that is, symbolic 
depictions intended to indicate external referents, for exam-
ple, miming eating to request food, or making a hammer-
ing motion to request a stone hammer. Some researchers 
have claimed that some intention-movements are actually 
functioning iconically, for example, when one gorilla ritu-
alistically motions another in a direction in a sexual or play 
context (Tanner and Byrne 1996). But these are most likely 
garden-variety ritualized behaviors that appear to humans to 
be iconic because they derive from attempts to actually move 
the body of the other in the desired direction, but they are 
not functioning iconically for the apes themselves. In experi-
ments, apes have systematically failed to either produce or 
comprehend iconic gestures in situations where it would 
benefit them to do so. For example, Grosse et al. (2015) set 
up a situation in which an ignorant human needed to know 
how to operate an apparatus to retrieve food for the ape, but 
they did not show her how to do it, even though they knew 
how to do it themselves. Bohn et al. (2016b) gave apes an 
iconic gesture showing them which apparatus they should 
operate in order to get food (i.e., the one that works like 
“this”), but again to no avail. It is not likely that the apes fail 
to see any resemblance between the iconic gesture and some 
referent (see Buttelmann et al. 2013), but more likely is that 
they do not understand the declarative referential act as such.
Tomasello (2008) concludes from these and other consid-
erations that although great apes do understand about direct-
ing the attention of others to things, they do not understand 
reference in human-like ways because human reference is, 
in effect, an invitation to share attention (Tomasello 1998). 
That is to say, a human act of reference may be glossed as: 
I am attending to something that I think you will find inter-
esting, and I would like you to join me in attending to it (so 
that you will do something in response). Human communi-
cation is therefore deeply cooperative, based on coopera-
tive motives and structured by individuals jointly attending 
to things of mutual interest. The deepest underlying issue 
that differentiates great ape gestural communication from 
human gestural communication, therefore, is cooperation. 
Great apes are essentially communicating in order to ful-
fill individualistic goals—and they understand others to be 
doing this as well—whereas humans are communicating 
cooperatively in the context of joint goals and joint attention.
Ape gestural communication and the origins 
of human language
Our claim here, then, is that great ape gestural communica-
tion is its own unique system with its own unique qualities. 
Researchers such as Byrne and colleagues are essentially 
arguing that ape gestures are very similar to the communi-
cative displays of other mammals (they have even likened 
them to some bird displays), whereas researchers such as 
Leavens and colleagues are arguing that they are very similar 
to human cooperative communication. Of course there are 
similarities in both directions, but there are unique qualities 
as well.
And so the study of great ape gestural communication 
is interesting and important in its own right as a unique 
system of animal communication. But it is also interesting 
and important because it very likely represents the evolu-
tionary starting point for human linguistic communication. 
Human linguistic communication is a form of intentional 
social action, and as such, its most likely precursor in pri-
mate communication is not inflexible forms of vocal com-
munication but rather intentionally and flexibly used gestural 
communication. Evidence for this proposal also comes from 
the fact that when deaf humans come together, they find it 
quite natural to create a conventional sign language in the 
gestural modality (e.g., Senghas et al. 2004; Sandler et al. 
2005). Evolutionarily, it is most likely that early humans 
were using attention-getters and intention-movements in the 
gestural modality—at some point transformed into pointing 
and pantomiming—for some time before their vocalizations 
came under intentional control. Initially, they added volun-
tarily controlled emotional expression to the communicative 
act, and later the vocal modality became predominant for 
well-known reasons involving such things as the requirement 
for long-distance communication in conditions of poor vis-
ibility, the freeing of the hands for other activities, and so 
forth (Tomasello 2008).
In this context, we would reiterate the importance of the 
distinction between attention-getters and intention-move-
ments as they represent precursors of the two basic ways 
that humans manipulate the attention and imagination of 
others gesturally: by pointing or otherwise deictically indi-
cating something in the immediate perceptual environment 
and by pantomiming or otherwise symbolically representing 
something in the imagination. Scaling up to language, atten-
tion-getters represent a kind of “missing link” on the way 
to human reference because they communicate indirectly, 
via the manipulation of the attention of the recipient to spe-
cific entities, and intention-movements represent a kind of 
“missing link” on the way to conventional linguistic symbols 
because they are actions that evoke in the recipient imagined 
(but not yet present) events and objects (Tomasello 2008).
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What is needed to get from great ape intention-move-
ments and attention-getters to human linguistic communica-
tion is a transformation in human social life, specifically, one 
that leads to a more cooperative lifestyle, underpinned by 
skills and motivations for shared intentionality (Tomasello 
2014). In this process, newly cooperative communicative 
motives emerge (i.e., declarative and informative) and fully 
developed processes of reference—as an invitation to joint 
attention—and conventional symbolic representation—as a 
socially shared medium of expression—transform the nature 
of communication and the cognitive processes underlying it. 
The study of great ape gestural communication, to repeat, 
is thus not only important and interesting in its own right, 
but it is also crucial to our understanding of the origins and 
evolution of human linguistic communication.
Acknowledgements Open access funding provided by Max Planck 
Society.
Compliance with ethical standards 
Conflict of interest Neither author has any conflict of interest relevant 
to this article.
Ethical approval This article does not report any new data with human 
participants or animals performed by any of the authors.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Crea-
tive Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creat iveco 
mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribu-
tion, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate 
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the 
Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Bohn M, Call J, Tomasello M (2015) Communication about absent 
entities in great apes and human infants. Cognition 145:63–72
Bohn M, Call J, Tomasello M (2016a) The role of past interactions in 
great apes’ communication about absent entities. J Comp Psychol 
130:351–357
Bohn M, Call J, Tomasello M (2016b) Comprehension of iconic ges-
tures by chimpanzees and human children. J Exp Child Psychol 
142:1–17
Bruner J (1981) Intention in the structure of action and interaction. 
In: Lipsett L (ed) Advances in infancy research, vol 1. Ablex, 
Norwood
Bullinger A, Wyman E, Melis A, Tomasello M (2011) Chimpanzees 
coordinate in a Stag Hunt game. Int J Primatol 32:1296–1310
Buttelmann D, Carpenter M, Call J, Tomasello M (2013) Chimpanzees 
(Pan troglodytes) recognize successful actions, but fail to imitate 
them. Anim Behav 86:755–761
Call J, Tomasello M (eds) (2007) The gestural communication of apes 
and monkeys. LEA, Manhaw
Cartmill EA, Byrne RW (2010) Semantics of primate gestures: inten-
tional meanings of orangutan gestures. Anim Cogn 13:793–804
Cheney D, Seyfarth R (1990) How monkeys see the world. The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, Chicago
Crockford C, Wittig RM, Zuberbühler K (2017) Vocalizing in chim-
panzees is influenced by social-cognitive processes. Sci Adv 
3(11):e1701742
Gardner R, Gardner B, Van Cantfort T (eds) (1989) Teaching sign 
language to chimpanzees. State University of New York Press, 
Albany
Genty E, Breuer T, Hobaiter C, Byrne R (2009) Gestural communica-
tion of the gorilla (Gorilla gorilla): repertoire, intentionality and 
possible origins. Anim Cogn 12:527–546
Gómez J (1990) The emergence of intentional communication as a 
problem-solving strategy in the gorilla. In: Parker ST, Gibson KR 
(eds) ‘Language’ and intelligence in monkeys and apes: compara-
tive developmental perspectives. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, pp 333–355
Greenfield P, Savage-Rumbaugh S (1990) Grammatical combination in 
Pan paniscus: Processes of learning and invention in the evolution 
and development of language. In: Parker ST, Gibson KR (eds) 
“Language” and intelligence in monkeys and apes. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, pp 540–578
Grosse K, Call J, Carpenter M, Tomasello M (2015) Differences in the 
ability of apes and children to instruct others using gestures. Lang 
Learn Dev 11:310–330
Halina M, Rossano F, Tomasello M (2013) The ontogenetic ritualiza-
tion of bonobo gestures. Anim Cogn 16:653–666
Halina M, Liebal K, Tomasello M (in press) The goal of ape pointing. 
PLoS One
Hammerschmidt K, Fischer J (2008) Constraints in primate vocal pro-
duction. In: Griebel U, Oller K (eds) The evolution of communi-
cative creativity: from fixed signals to contextual flexibility. The 
MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 93–119
Hobaiter C, Byrne R (2011a) The gestural repertoire of the wild chim-
panzee. Anim Cogn 14:745–767
Hobaiter C, Byrne R (2011b) Serial gesturing by wild chimpanzees: its 
nature and function for communication. Anim Cogn 14:827–838
Hobaiter C, Leavens D, Byrne R (2013) Deictic gesturing in wild chim-
panzees (Pan troglodytes)? Some possible cases. J Comp Psychol 
128:82–87
Leavens D, Hopkins W (1998) Intentional communication by chim-
panzees: a cross-sectional study of the use of referential gestures. 
Dev Psychol 34:813–822
Leavens D, Hopkins W, Bard K (2005) Understanding the point of 
chimpanzee pointing: epigenesis and ecological validity. Curr Dir 
Psychol Sci 14:185–189
Leavens D, Reamer L, Mareno M, Russell J, Wilson D, Schapiro 
S, Hopkins W (2015) Distal communication by chimpanzees 
(Pan troglodytes): evidence for common ground? Child Dev 
86:1623–1638
Liebal K, Call J (2012) The origins of nonhuman primates’ manual 
gestures. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 367:118–128
Liebal K, Call J, Tomasello M (2004a) The use of gesture sequences 
in chimpanzees. Am J Primatol 64:377–396
Liebal K, Pika S, Call J, Tomasello M (2004b) To move or not to move: 
how apes alter the attentional states of humans when begging for 
food. Interact Stud 5:199–219
Lock A (1978) Action, gesture and symbol—the emergence of lan-
guage. Academic Press, London
Lyn H, Russell J, Hopkins W (2010) The impact of environment on 
the comprehension of declarative communication in apes. Psychol 
Sci 21:360–365
Lyn H, Russell J, Leavens D, Bard K, Boysen S, Schaeffer J, Hopkins 
W (2014) Apes communicate about absent and displaced objects: 
methodology matters. Anim Cogn 17:85–94
Melis A, Tomasello M (2013) Chimpanzees’ strategic helping in a 
collaborative task. Biol Lett 9:20130009
Melis A, Hare B, Tomasello M (2009) Chimpanzees coordinate in a 
negotiation game. Evolut Hum Behav 30:381–392
Animal Cognition 
1 3
Mulcahy N, Call J (2009) The performance of bonobos (Pan panis-
cus), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and orangutans (Pongo pyg-
maeus) in two versions of an object choice task. J Comp Psychol 
123:304–309
Nishida T (1980) The leaf-clipping display: a newly-discovered expres-
sive gesture in wild chimpanzees. J Hum Evol 9:117–128
Pika S, Mitani J (2006) Referential gestural communication in wild 
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Curr Biol 16:R191–R192
Plooij F (1978) Some basic traits of language in wild chimpanzees? 
In: Lock A (ed) Action, gesture and symbol—the emergence of 
language. Academic Press, London, pp 111–131
Rivas E (2005) Recent use of signs by chimpanzees in interactions with 
humans. J Comp Psychol 119:404–417
Sandler W, Meir I, Padden C, Aronoff M (2005) The emergence of 
grammar: systematic structure in a new language. Proc Natl Acad 
Sci 102(7):2661–2665
Schel A, Townsend S, Machanda Z, Zuberbühler K, Slocombe K 
(2013) Chimpanzee alarm call production meets key criteria for 
intentionality. PLoS ONE 8(10):e76674
Senghas A, Kita S, Özyürek A (2004) Children creating core proper-
ties of language: evidence from an emerging sign language in 
Nicaragua. Science 305:1779–1782
Seyfarth R, Cheney D (2003) Signalers and receivers in animal com-
munication. Annu Rev Psychol 54:145–173
Seyfarth R, Cheney D, Marler P (1980) Monkey responses to three dif-
ferent alarm calls: evidence of predator classification and semantic 
communication. Science 210:801–803
Smith W (1977) The behavior of communicating: an ethological 
approach. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Tanner J, Byrne R (1993) Concealing facial evidence of mood: perspec-
tive-taking in a captive Gorilla. Primates 34:451–457
Tanner J, Byrne R (1996) Representation of action through iconic 
gesture in a captive lowland gorilla. Curr Anthropol 37:162–173
Tinbergen N (1951) The study of instinct. Oxford University Press, 
New York
Tinbergen N (1952) ‘Derived’ activities; their causation, biological 
significance, origin, and emancipation during evolution. Q Rev 
Biol 27:1–32
Tomasello M (1998) Reference: intending that others jointly attend. 
Pragmat Cogn 6:229–244
Tomasello M (2006) Why don’t apes point? In: Enfield N, Levinson S 
(eds) Roots of human sociality. Wenner-Grenn, Stockholm
Tomasello M (2008) Origins of human communication. MIT Press, 
Cambridge
Tomasello M (2014) A natural history of human thinking. Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge
Tomasello M, Carpenter M (2005) The emergence of social cognition 
in three young chimpanzees. Monogr Soc Res Child Dev 70:279
Tomasello M, George B, Kruger A, Farrar J, Evans A (1985) The 
development of gestural communication in young chimpanzees. 
J Hum Evolut 14:175–186
Tomasello M, Gust D, Frost T (1989) A longitudinal investigation 
of gestural communication in young chimpanzees. Primates 
30:35–50
Tomasello M, Call J, Nagell K, Olguin R, Carpenter M (1994) The 
learning and use of gestural signals by young chimpanzees: a 
trans-generational study. Primates 37:137–154
Tomasello M, Call J, Warren J, Frost T, Carpenter M, Nagell K (1997) 
The ontogeny of chimpanzee gestural signals: a comparison across 
groups and generations. Evolut Commun 1:223–253
Tomonaga M, Tanaka M, Matsuzawa T, Myowa-Yamakoshi M, Kosugi 
D, Mizuno Y, Okamoto S, Yamaguchi M, Bard K (2004) Develop-
ment of social cognition in infant chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes): 
face recognition, smiling, gaze, and the lack of triadic interactions. 
Jpn Psychol Res 46:227–235
van der Goot M, Tomasello M, Liszkowski U (2014) Differences in 
the nonverbal requests of great apes and human infants. Child 
Dev 85:444–455
Veà J, Sabater-Pi J (1998) Spontaneous pointing behaviour in the wild 
pygmy chimpanzee (Pan paniscus). Folia Primatol 69:289–290
Zuberbühler K (2005) The phylogenetic roots of language: evidence 
from primate communication and cognition. Curr Dir Psychol 
Sci 14:126–130
